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Access & identity

Regaining control of privileged access

Privileged accounts are every attacker's first target: they open the whole infrastructure. Yet they often remain shared, weakly authenticated and poorly traced. Here is how we restore control without getting in your teams' way.

The challenge

The keys to the kingdom, often with neither lock nor logbook

In most infrastructures, a handful of accounts opens everything: domain administrators, service accounts, access to hypervisors, backups and network equipment. That access is frequently shared between several people, protected by a single password kept in a file, and rarely revoked when a contractor finishes an assignment.

The problem is not only the theft of those credentials: it is also the impossibility of knowing who did what. Without traceability, a compromise becomes very hard to reconstruct, and the accountability that auditors and insurers expect is not met.

Our role is to make that access named, strongly authenticated, granted at the right moment and recorded — while keeping administration smooth, because otherwise teams will work around the whole thing.

What is at stake
  • Shared, non-named administrator accounts
  • Secrets stored in files or scripts
  • Contractor access still live long after the assignment ends
  • No traceability of privileged actions
  • Immediate spread in case of compromise (ransomware)
Diagram

A single gateway for sensitive access

Administration through a controlled gateway Administrators · contractors · service accountsnamed access and strong authentication (MFA)Bastion host & secrets vaultjust-in-time elevation · recorded sessionActiveDirectoryServers &hypervisorsNetworkequipmentBackupsDatabasesCloudconsoles
No more direct access to critical assets: administration goes through a bastion host that authenticates, distributes the secrets and records the sessions.
Our approach

How we proceed

We start by finding out what exists, then secure in order of criticality — without breaking operations on the way.

01

Inventory of privileged access

A census of administrator accounts, service accounts, contractor access and application secrets: who holds what, on which assets, with what level of traceability. This is almost always the most revealing step.

02

Target model and access rules

Defining the model: which roles, which elevations, for how long, with which approvals. We align it with your operational constraints and with the audit requirements that apply to you.

03

Vault and bastion host

Deployment of a secrets vault and an administration gateway: strong authentication, automatic password rotation, just-in-time access and recorded sessions.

04

Gradual migration

Access is moved over in waves, starting with the most critical assets (directory, backups, hypervisors). Direct access is closed as you go, once the new path has proved itself.

05

Control and operations

Access reviews, alerts on abnormal use, logs connected to monitoring, and knowledge transfer so your teams stay autonomous.

Services involved

Several disciplines, a single point of contact

PAM touches architecture, governance and detection: we cover all three, and we validate the result with offensive testing.

Deliverables
  • Inventory of privileged accounts and secrets
  • Documented access model and elevation rules
  • Vault and bastion host deployed and hardened
  • Session traceability and access reviews
  • Operating documentation and knowledge transfer
Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

It is a good start, but not enough on its own. The vault protects the secrets; it does not record what happens once the session is open. The point of the bastion host is to add accountability — who connected, to which asset, and what took place.

If it is badly designed, yes — and it will be worked around. So we shape the paths with the teams concerned: just-in-time access, single sign-on and transparent recording. Properly tuned, going through the bastion host becomes simpler than managing passwords by hand.

This is one of the most immediate gains: named access, time-limited, restricted to the assets concerned and recorded. The end of the assignment closes the access automatically, which removes orphaned accounts.

Yes, very directly. Most ransomware attacks progress by harvesting administrator credentials and then reaching the backups. Making that access named, temporary and traced breaks the progression and greatly reduces the impact.

Who holds the keys to your infrastructure?

An inventory of privileged access gives a clear picture quickly — and often a few surprises. Let's talk.